Touro Law Review
Volume 30
Number 4 Annual New York State Constitutional
Issue

Article 10

November 2014

Seize First, Search Later: The Hunt for Digital Evidence
Paige Bartholomew

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
Bartholomew, Paige (2014) "Seize First, Search Later: The Hunt for Digital Evidence," Touro Law Review:
Vol. 30: No. 4, Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/10

This Fourth Amendment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Seize First, Search Later: The Hunt for Digital Evidence
Cover Page Footnote
30-4

This fourth amendment is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/
iss4/10

Bartholomew: Seize First, Search Later

SEIZE FIRST, SEARCH LATER: THE HUNT FOR DIGITAL
EVIDENCE
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. DeProspero1
(decided March 26, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of computers in criminal activity has popularized a
new form of evidence known as digital evidence. Police officers and
law enforcement agents now commonly seize and search computers in
connection with criminal investigations, the evidence obtained from
which is often critical to securing convictions. Computer searches,
however, are much different from ordinary searches for physical evidence due to the complexity of information stored within a computer
or hard drive as well as the technical expertise required to retrieve such
evidence. Often times, the police seize a suspect’s computer and take
it to a police laboratory for extensive examination by forensics experts.
These forensic examinations may take days, months, or even years.2
Currently, there are no bright line rules governing the scope of
the police search or the amount of time law enforcement may ordinarily retain the seized property before returning it to a suspect. Not surprisingly, there have been many challenges to the constitutionality of
computer searches, especially in the context of child pornography—in
which the evidence found on a suspect’s computer can be highly incriminating. Courts have grappled with these challenges and have attempted to apply constitutional restraints to ensure that the scope and
execution of these searches fall within the limits prescribed by the

1

987 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 2013).
See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L.
REV 279, 300-01 (2005) (emphasis added) (explaining the need for current laws to be amended so as to strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and individual rights in
property and privacy in light of existing technological realities).
2

1027

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 10

1028

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Fourth Amendment.3
Despite varying approaches to this issue, courts and legislatures
need not create new rules to address these concerns. Rather, existing
Fourth Amendment principles can be applied in the context of computer forensic searches. These principles appropriately balance an individual’s privacy interests with the state’s interest in conducting a thorough search of digital evidence to protect society from sexual
predators. The goal, then, is to strike a fair balance between the state’s
interest in protecting society from sexual predators and the privacy
concerns that are part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment. If effective law enforcement requires forensic computer searches, then these
searches should be permitted. However, investigators should begin the
forensic analysis expeditiously and return any property that does not
contain incriminating evidence “within a reasonable period of time.”4
Because the facts and circumstances differ in each case, what is considered reasonable in one situation may not be considered reasonable
in another. Therefore, the reasonableness of an electronic forensics
search should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
This case note will discuss the issue presented to the New York
State Court of Appeals in People v. DeProspero—whether a subsequent forensic analysis of the defendant’s computer, performed approximately seven months after the computer was initially seized and
after the defendant had already served a prison sentence on related
charges, violated the Fourth Amendment.5
II.

PEOPLE V. DEPROSPERO
A.

Factual & Procedural Background

In 2008 and 2009, an undercover New York State Police detective investigated individuals sharing child pornography on the Internet

3

U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

Id.
4
5

Kerr, supra note 2, at 313 (emphasis added).
DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 265-66.
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through various file-sharing networks.6 A particular IP address was
suspected of downloading child pornography files over forty times between February and March of 2009.7 The investigator confirmed that
the downloaded images contained child pornography and traced the IP
address to DeProspero’s home.8 Based on that investigation, the police
obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of the defendant’s home
and the seizure of his computers and electronics, including “keyboards,
printers, modems, scanners, or digital cameras and their internal or external storage media.”9 When police officers searched DeProspero’s
home on May 5, 2009, they discovered a digital image of a female
child performing oral sex on a male adult on his computer.10 The defendant was arrested, and the police seized his computer as well as two
digital cameras.11
The electronics seized from the defendant’s home pursuant to
the May 2009 warrant were not promptly taken to the State Police
Crime Laboratory for a forensic examination.12 Mistakenly believing
that the only evidence against the defendant was the image of child
pornography found on his computer during the search, the Assistant
District Attorney (“ADA”) offered DeProspero a light prison sentence—six months—and ten years of probation in exchange for his
plea of guilty to possession of child pornography.13 The defendant
immediately accepted the offer and was sentenced on November 2,
2009.14
After sentencing, DeProspero’s attorney contacted the ADA
and requested the return of the electronics that were seized during the
search of the defendant’s home in May 2009.15 Before returning the
defendant’s property, however, the ADA instructed the New York
State Police to examine it to ensure that it was free of contraband.16
6

People v. DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011).
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 791-92.
10
Id. at 792.
11
DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
12
Id.
13
Id. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.16 (McKinney 2013) (“A person is guilty of possessing a sexual performance by a child when . . . he knowingly has in his possession or control, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.”).
14
DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
15
Id.
16
Id.
7
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Upon fully examining the contents of the seized property, the police
discovered hundreds of pornographic images and videos of children on
the defendant’s computer, as well as a deleted video clip on one of the
defendant’s digital cameras.17 Hundreds of still-frame images were recovered from the deleted video clip, depicting the defendant engaged
in oral sex with an autistic male child about twelve years old.18
DeProspero was indicted on one count of predatory sexual assault against a child and four counts of criminal sexual acts in the first
degree.19 He sought to suppress the evidence seized from his computer
and camera on the grounds that the May 2009 search warrant had expired by the time investigators searched his computer in January
2010.20 He argued that the warrant was no longer supported by probable cause and that the police lacked jurisdiction to search his computer
and camera once the first criminal proceeding against him had terminated.21
The Oneida County Court denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress the evidence recovered from the camera and computer, and
determined that the May 2009 search warrant was supported by probable cause.22 The court acknowledged that this case presented an issue
of first impression—whether the delayed analysis of lawfully seized
property constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.23 However, it concluded that there was “nothing inherently
wrong or improper about a delayed analysis or inspection of property
that has been lawfully seized.”24 According to the court, the search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the items that were seized from
17

Id.
Id.
19
DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.96 (McKinney
2006):
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault against a child when, being
eighteen years old or more, he or she commits the crime of rape in the
first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual
abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in
the first degree, as defined in this article, and the victim is less than thirteen years old.
Id.
20
DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 793.
23
Id.
24
Id.
18
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his home.25 Although there was approximately a seven-month delay
between the search of the defendant’s home and the forensic search of
the seized property, the court concluded that “the May 2009 warrant
continued to provide probable cause for the subsequent search.”26
Thus, the police had no obligation to obtain a second search warrant in
order to conduct a complete forensic analysis of the property seized in
May 2009.27 In other words, the court deemed that the search warrant
was valid through, and including, the time the police thoroughly
searched the defendant’s property.
DeProspero pleaded guilty to predatory sexual assault against a
child after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence.28 He
was sentenced to a term of eighteen years to life and subsequently appealed his conviction.29 The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New
York State Court of Appeals.30
B.

The New York Court of Appeals Decision

The issue presented to the Court of Appeals was whether the
January 2010 forensic examination of the defendant’s computer and
cameras constituted a legal search and seizure.31 Specifically, whether
the authority provided by the May 2009 warrant had expired—and in
the absence of new judicial authorization, whether the delayed forensic
examination was illegal and the evidence obtained from it inadmissible.32 The defendant alleged that the prosecution resulting in his September 2009 conviction had run its course and the seized items were
no longer useful in that or any other criminal proceeding.33 Thus, because there was no outstanding criminal matter that needed to be resolved, he argued that the contents of the digital camera had become
irrelevant and, as a result, his legitimate expectation of privacy had
25

DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 793. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (providing that Fourth Amendment protections turn on the absence or presence of an
expectation of privacy).
26
DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
27
Id.
28
DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 264.
29
DeProspero, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
30
DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 265.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 266.
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been restored.34
The New York State Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s
arguments and upheld the judgment of the Appellate Division.35 The
court began its analysis with the proposition that Fourth Amendment
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures are “prevalently understood to protect what an individual may legitimately expect to
keep private against unwarranted intrusion by agents of the state.”36 A
proponent of a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation must be able
to allege a legitimate expectation of privacy in the places or items said
to have been illegally searched or seized.37 In applying this standard,
the court found that the defendant in this case had no legitimate expectation of privacy at the time of the forensic examination.38 Although
the initial criminal matter against the defendant had been resolved, the
authority of the May 2009 warrant did not vanish at the time of the forensic search. The court explained:
It is manifest that the continued validity of a search
warrant . . . is not necessarily tied to the pendency of
any particular prosecution. The duration of a warrant’s
authority is more appropriately measured by the persistence of the cause for its issue. Here, the predicate for
the seizure and examination of defendant’s digital media devices was at least as compelling in January 2010
as it had been in May 2009. This being so, there appears no reason to conclude that the warrant did not at
the time of the state laboratory examination remain valid and allow both the State’s continued custody of the
seized property and the “lesser-related intrusion” involved in that property’s inspection.39
In the court’s view, nothing had happened since the seizure of
DeProspero’s property to “diminish the cause for the warrant’s issue.”40 Accordingly, the warrant remained valid at the time of the forensic examination, and the defendant had no relevant expectation of

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 265.
Id. at 266 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 350).
Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
Id. at 267.
Id. at 266-67.
DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 266.
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privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.41
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS APPLICATION TO
ELECTRONICS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”42 Warrants to execute a search or seizure must
be issued “upon probable cause . . . and particularly describ[e] the
place to be searched . . . or things to be seized.”43 The Supreme Court
has stated that the particularity requirement for a warrant was designed
to ensure that “those searches deemed necessary . . . [are] as limited as
possible.”44 Furthermore, “[t]he requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
[that describes] another.”45 These rules help ensure that the search will
be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not result in a general
rummaging through a suspect’s property.46
The dictates of the Fourth Amendment have been consistently
applied to searches and seizures for many years. Their application to
computer searches, however, is a recent development. With the vast
amounts of technological data that can be stored in a computer, commentators have debated that current laws need to be amended so that
the Fourth Amendment still protects citizens against overly broad
searches.47 Professor Orin Kerr suggested that applying existing
Fourth Amendment principles to digital evidence is a troublesome endeavor.48 He argued that searching through a computer is roughly

41

Id. at 267.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43
Id.
44
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (describing the underlying
rationale for prohibiting the execution of a general or overly broad warrant).
45
See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (describing the Supreme Court’s
rational behind the particularity requirement).
46
See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (explaining that the scope of a lawful
search is defined by the object of the search and the place in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found).
47
See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (2010) (discussing how Fourth Amendment protections currently apply to the internet).
48
See Kerr, supra note 2, at 289.
42
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analogous to searching for a needle in a haystack,49 and that new rules
must be developed to regulate how investigators look through the haystack to find the needle.50 While professor Kerr was mostly concerned
with overbroad searches, he also addressed the issue of how these
overbroad searches result in forensic examinations that take an unreasonable amount of time to complete.51 Kerr contended that existing
rules only focus on a suspect’s property interest rather than a suspect’s
privacy interest.52 As a result, “the police can keep the [evidence] and
continue to search it without apparent limit.”53 According to Professor
Kerr, while existing rules may be acceptable for a search of physical
property, they reflect a general “[in]attention to the legitimate interests
that [a suspect may] have in [his] computer and files.”54
IV.

THE FORENSIC ANALYSIS: A TWO-STEP PROCESS

After a magistrate judge has determined that a warrant application is sufficiently particularized and supported by probable cause, the
police will execute the warrant.55 A search for digital evidence is a
two-step process.56 The first step, known as the “physical search
stage,” occurs when the police enter the location to be searched and
seize the electronic storage devices implicated by the warrant.57 This
on-site seizure commonly includes the confiscation of computers,
disks, CD-ROMs, and other electronic devices that may contain relevant evidence.58 In most cases, agents will either create an “image
copy” of the hard drive or seize the electronic devices for a later search
of the hardware.59
49

Id. at 301.
Id. (“If no rules regulate how investigators look through the haystack to find the needle,
any justification for a search may justify an invasive look through computer files that represent a small city’s worth of private information.”).
51
Id. at 305.
52
Id. at 306.
53
Kerr, supra note 2, at 306.
54
Id.
55
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing in pertinent part: “[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
56
Corey J. Mantei, Pornography and Privacy in Plain View: Applying the Plain View
Doctrine to Computer Searches, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 985, 1006 (2011) (describing the techniques utilized by law enforcement agents for searching a computer’s file system).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1006-07.
59
Id. at 1007.
50
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The second stage, known as the “electronic search stage,” occurs when the government conducts a forensic examination of the
seized digital storage device.60 This process almost always occurs offsite (at a police crime laboratory) and is normally executed by specialized computer technicians after the initial physical seizure.61 The electronic search stage usually requires that the computer be taken off-site
to be thoroughly searched because in a majority of cases, forensic
analysis of a hard drive takes too long to perform on-site during the
initial execution of a search warrant.62
Examining a computer for evidence of a crime is a rather time
consuming process. Even if the police know specific information
about the files they seek, the data may be encrypted, mislabeled, stored
in hidden directories, or embedded in “slack space”63 that may not be
discovered absent a full forensic examination.64 Furthermore, evidence
of a crime may not always be located within a file.65 It may be hidden
deep within the computer’s data, rendering the evidence extremely difficult to locate and retrieve without the appropriate tools and time.66 It
can potentially take weeks to find the specific information described in
the warrant because computer storage devices can contain extraordinary amounts of information.67 Because examining a computer for
digital evidence of a crime is complex and time consuming, it is unrealistic to conduct a thorough on-site search of a computer or any other
electronic media device.68 For these reasons, courts have approved the
60

Id.
Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV.
1241, 1248 (2010) (describing how computer searches differ from traditional searches).
62
Id. at 1249.
63
See United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 142-43 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)
(“Deleted files are not wholly removed from the computer. A deleted file is marked as unallocated file space, which allows that file to be overwritten by new files. A computer’s deleted files make up what is known . . . as the disk slack space.”).
64
See United States v. Hill, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d 459
F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530-31 (E.D.
Va. 1999) (noting that criminals intentionally mislabel files or attempt to bury incriminating
files within innocuously named directories).
65
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 76, available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
66
Id.
67
See Hill, 459 F.3d at 974-75 (“[T]he officers would have to examine every one of what
may be thousands of files on a disk—a process that could take many hours and perhaps
days.”).
68
In cases involving large quantities of paper documents, courts have traditionally allowed investigators to remove the documents to an off-site location for review to determine
61
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removal of computers to an off-site location for review, but so far have
been unable to reach a consensus on the permissible time period for
examining seized media.69
V.

PERMISSIBLE TIME PERIOD FOR EXAMINING SEIZED MEDIA

Statutes that require the timely execution of a search warrant
ensure that probable cause still exists at the time of the search.70 A delay in executing a search warrant may render the probable cause determination stale.71
Many courts have agreed that neither the Fourth Amendment
nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure place explicit limits on
the duration of any forensic analysis and have upheld forensic analyses
that were conducted months after investigators lawfully seized a computer.72 The absence of a specific time period for a forensic examination of electronically stored data is confirmed by the most recent
amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the
seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or
copying of electronically stored information. Unless
otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the
which of them fall within the scope of the warrant. See United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d
609, 616 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding the seizure of an entire file cabinet when such seizure
was motivated by the impracticability of on-site sorting).
69
See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (providing that the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain the evidence described in a
warrant is, in most instances, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of the computer
and all available disks); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he affidavit explained why it was necessary to seize the entire computer system in order to examine the electronic data for contraband. It also justified taking the entire system off site because of the time, expertise, and controlled environment required for a proper analysis.”).
See also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“[U]ntil technology
and law enforcement expertise render on-site computer records searching both possible and
practical, wholesale seizures, if adequately safeguarded, must occur.”).
70
People v. Kibblewhite, 178 Cal. App. 3d 783, 785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
71
United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997).
72
See United States v. Burns, No. 07CR556, 2008 WL 4542990, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
29, 2008) (upholding a ten month delay); United States v. Gorrell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 48, 55 n.5
(D.D.C. 2004) (upholding a ten month delay); United States v. Hernandez, 183 F. Supp.2d
468, 480-81 (D.P.R. 2002) (upholding a six week delay); United States v. Triumph Capital
Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 66 (D. Conn. 2002) (providing that as long as the time was reasonable under the circumstances, a search of weeks or months does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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warrant. The time for executing the warrant in Rule
41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site
copying of the media or information, and not to any later off-site copying or review.73
This section of Rule 41 was amended in 2009, as courts became aware
that computers and other electronic storage media commonly contain
such large amounts of information, all of which is impractical for law
enforcement to review during execution of the warrant at the search location.74 However, the amendment still does not impose any rule as to
when investigators must begin a forensic examination involving electronically stored information, nor does it impose a time limit or deadline on the duration of such a search:
[T]he practical reality is that there is no “one size fits
all” presumptive period. A substantial amount of time
can be involved in the forensic imaging and review of
information. This is due to the sheer size of the storage
capacity of media, difficulties created by encryption
and booby traps, and the workload of the computer
labs. The rule does not prevent a judge from imposing
a deadline for the return of the storage media or access
to the electronically stored information at the time the
warrant is issued. However, to arbitrarily set a presumptive time period for the return could result in frequent petitions to the court for additional time.75
For these reasons, the current version of Rule 41 does not place explicit limitations on when the search of the media must occur. As long as
the subsequent search is “consistent with the warrant,” it is considered
valid.76
Although Rule 41 does not set forth a specific time period for
which seized media may be examined, the Fourth Amendment does
require that forensic analysis of a computer be conducted within a reasonable time.77 In determining the reasonableness of the time for con73

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See United States v. Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077 (D.N.D. 2008) (“[T]he
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that the forensic analysis of computers
and other electronic equipment take place within a specific time limit. Any subsequent
search only needs to be conducted within a reasonable time.”). See also Burns, 2008 WL
74

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 10

1038

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

ducting a forensic analysis, courts have recognized that the examination of computer data is a difficult and lengthy process.78 Some courts
have treated the dissipation of probable cause as the best indicator of
the reasonableness of a search’s length.79 Thus, as long as probable
cause to believe that the seized media contains contraband still exists at
the time of the forensic examination, the search will not violate the
Fourth Amendment.80
While the reasonableness requirement is a rather flexible
standard governing off-site searches, some courts have attempted to
limit the forensics process to prevent a “general rummaging through
seized computers.”81 For example, some magistrate judges have begun
to issue warrants seeking to seize computers on the condition that the
government adheres to certain restrictions on the subsequent search.82
Some judges have refused to sign search warrants authorizing the seizure of computers unless the government conducts the forensic examination in a short period of time, such as thirty days.83 One magistrate
judge even refused the government’s request for a warrant to search a
computer unless the government first agreed to abide by preapproved
search methods to ensure that the search was constitutionally reasonable.84
Current law does not expressly authorize judges to issue war4542990, at *8 (“A delay must be reasonable, but there is no constitutional upper limit on
reasonableness.”).
78
See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
79
See United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The Fourth Amendment itself ‘contains no requirements about when the search or seizure is to occur or the duration.’ However, ‘unreasonable delay in the execution of a warrant that results in the lapse
of probable cause will invalidate a warrant.’ ”) (citations omitted).
80
See United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the
delay in forensically analyzing the seized evidence did not have an effect on the probable
cause determination); see also Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. at 66 (“Delay in executing a warrant beyond the time set forth in [FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)] is not unreasonable unless, at the time it is executed, probable cause no longer exists and the defendant
demonstrates legal prejudice as a result of the delay.”).
81
Kerr, supra note 2, at 315.
82
Id.
83
See United States v. Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999) (noting that the
magistrate judge permitted agents to seize the computers of a child pornography suspect on
the condition that the agents searched through the computers for evidence within thirty
days).
84
See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d. 953, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (requiring the government to provide a protocol outlining the methods it would use to ensure
that its search was reasonably designed to focus on documents related to the criminal activity).
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rants that place rigid time restraints on law enforcement’s subsequent
examination of seized evidence, and whether such limits should be imposed remains an open question—especially in light of the recent
amendment to Rule 41.85 Amidst all the ambiguity regarding off-site
searches of electronic data, one thing is perfectly clear—a valid warrant entitles investigators to seize computers and search them off-site at
a later date.
VI.

FEDERAL APPROACH

Currently, many federal courts apply a “reasonableness” standard in determining if a delay between the initial seizure of the computer and the subsequent search of its data was constitutional.86 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently
decided United States v. Metter, a case that “may impact electronic
discovery in future criminal investigations.”87 In 2010, the government indicted the defendant, Metter, and six others, alleging that he
had participated in a fraudulent scheme relating to transactions in the
common stock of Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., a company
where he was the president and CEO.88 Pursuant to a search warrant,
the government seized computers from both the Spongetech offices
and Metter’s home.89 This included, among other things, sixty-one
computer hard drives, the company email server, and contents of Metter’s four personal hard drives.90 With respect to the seized computer
hard drives, the government created copies of the data and promptly
returned the computer to its appropriate owner, but the government did
not conduct a forensic examination of the hard drives until fifteen
months after it executed the search warrant.91
Metter filed a motion to suppress the seized materials, arguing
that “the government’s significant delay in conducting off-site searches
of the evidence merit[ed] blanket suppression of all seized and imaged
evidence” because a delay of fifteen months was unreasonable and
would violate the Fourth Amendment.92 The government’s contention
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

DOJ MANUAL, supra note 62, at 93-94.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
860 F. Supp. 2d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 210-11.
Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
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was that the wholesale seizure of hard drives and the subsequent offsite review of such data were necessary given the digital nature of the
evidence.93 With respect to the delay between the seizure and forensic
analysis, the government argued that “its prompt return of the original
electronic evidence . . . negate[d] any harm arising out of its delayed
review of the imaged evidence.”94
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York began
its discussion by noting that this was a case of first impression for the
Second Circuit.95 The question before the court was whether the government’s retention of the seized electronics for a fifteen-month span
before conducting the forensic search violated the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.96 The court determined that the answer to
this question required a careful case-by-case factual analysis “because
what may be appropriate under one set of facts and circumstances may
not be so under another.”97 That being said, the court found that the
government’s “more than fifteen-month delay” in reviewing the imaged copy of the seized electronic evidence, under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, constituted an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment:
An image of an electronic document contains all of the
same information as the original electronic document.
To the extent the owner or custodian of the electronic
document has privacy concerns regarding the government’s retention of the original document, the owner
would have identical privacy concerns with the government’s retention of the imaged document. For example, the seizure of a personal email account could . . .
yield personal communications between a cheating
spouse and his or her paramour or communications between an individual and his or her family regarding an
embarrassing medical condition. These hypothetical
communications clearly fall outside the scope of the
search warrants in this case . . . . Thus, the government’s long-term retention of images of these commu-

93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
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nications presents the same privacy concerns as would
the government’s retention of the original communications.98
However, the court acknowledged that searching a computer
for evidence of a crime presents a “complex situation, given the extraordinary number of documents a computer can contain and store and
the owner’s ability to password protect and/or encrypt files, documents, and electronic communications.”99 Thus, law enforcement
should be permitted some flexibility and latitude in reviewing electronic evidence.100 The correct standard, therefore, in determining whether
the government acted appropriately with regard to an off-site forensic
search is a flexible one—reasonableness.101
Applying this standard, the court found that the government’s
delay in reviewing the seized evidence was unreasonable under the circumstances.102 It noted that while numerous cases have held that a
several-month delay between the initial seizure of electronic evidence
and the completion of the government’s review of that evidence may
be reasonable in some cases,103 the court found no authority indicating
that the government may seize electronic data and then retain that data
indefinitely without any plans to begin the forensic analysis.104 Thus,
the court found that the government’s “blatant disregard for its responsibility” to begin a prompt forensic analysis of the imaged evidence,
under these circumstances, was unreasonable.105
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
in United States v. Hernandez,106 also employed the standard of reasonableness in determining whether a delay in the forensic analysis of
seized computer data violated the Fourth Amendment. In Hernandez,
the court noted that “[n]either [Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] nor the Fourth Amendment provides for a specific time
limit in which a computer may undergo a government forensic exami98

Id.
Id. at 213.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 214 (citing United States v. Graziano, 558 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“[T]he manner of the execution of the warrant in searching the computer also will be subject to judicial review under a ‘reasonableness’ standard.”)).
102
Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d. at 215.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
183 F. Supp. 2d 468 (D.P.R. 2002).
99
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nation after it has been seized pursuant to a search warrant.”107 It also
recognized that in many cases, the forensic search of the computer
takes place at a different location from where the computer was initially seized due to the sheer volume of information contained within the
files.108 According to the court in Hernandez, the same principle is applied when a search warrant is executed for voluminous documents.109
“The documents are seized within the time frame established in the
warrant but examination of these documents may take a longer time,
and extensions or additional warrants are not required.”110 The examination of the seized documents at a later date does not automatically
make the evidence subject to suppression.111 The rationale that certain
searches may be conducted off-site has been extended to include computers.112 The court in Hernandez concluded that because the search of
defendant’s home took place within the time period specified in the
warrant, it was reasonable for the government to take additional time
to inspect the images in the floppy disk, especially after already having
discovered child pornography in the defendant’s hard disk.113
Similarly, the court in United States v. Mutschelknaus114 also
addressed the issue of whether a delayed forensic search violated the
Fourth Amendment. In that case, the defendant, Chad Allen
Mutschelknaus, was charged with possessing and distributing materials
involving the sexual exploitation of minors.115 Investigators submitted
a warrant application and supporting affidavit to a magistrate judge for
permission to search the defendant’s residence.116 The application
specifically requested that law enforcement “be allowed to conduct the
forensic search of the computer and electronic storage media after the
execution and return of the search warrant.”117 The judge granted the
search warrant and ordered that the search be conducted “on or before

107

Id. at 480.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Hernandez, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
112
Id. at 480-81 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. 97-192, 1999 WL 815818, at *9
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1999)).
113
Id. at 481.
114
564 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D.N.D. 2008).
115
Id. at 1073-74.
116
Id. at 1074.
117
Id. (emphasis added).
108
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December 22, 2007.”118 The warrant was executed on December 12,
2007, and the forensic analysis of the seized computer was conducted
between December 14, 2007, and February 12, 2008.119
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from that search, contending, inter alia, that the forensic analysis of the
computer and electronic media was an unreasonable search in violation
of Rule 41(e)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because the forensic search “was conducted more than ten days after the
issuance of the search warrant.”120 The District Court for the District
of North Dakota rejected this argument.121 Relying instead on the
analysis in Hernandez, the court held that the Fourth Amendment only
requires that the subsequent forensic examination of the computer be
made within a reasonable time.122 The court recognized “that a search
of computer data involves much more preparation than an ordinary
search . . . and that the search may involve much more information.”123
Applying the reasonableness standard, the court in Mutschelknaus concluded that because the computer and electronic media were seized
within the time limit established in the search warrant and the forensic
analysis took place within the time period granted by the magistrate
judge, the evidence would not be suppressed.124 The court did not limit its holding on the fact that the forensic analysis was conducted within the time period established by the magistrate judge. Instead, the
court held that “[a]ny subsequent search only needs to be conducted
within a reasonable time.”125
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, finding that “[b]ecause of the nature of this evidence, the . . . delay in searching the media did not alter the probable
cause analysis.”126 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit found that the police did not act in bad faith, or “show a reckless disregard for proper
procedure.”127 The court recognized that searches of computers take
118

Id.
Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
120
Id. at 1076.
121
Id. at 1077.
122
Id. at 1076-77.
123
Id. at 1076.
124
Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1077.
125
Id. (emphasis added).
126
United States v. Mutschelknaus, 592 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173).
127
Id.
119
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longer than ordinary searches and that other courts have permitted the
delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers “because of the complexity of the search.”128
The Eighth Circuit applied the reasonableness standard again in
United States v. Brewer.129 In Brewer, the court concluded that the delay in forensically analyzing the seized evidence did not have any effect on the probable cause determination.130 The court stated that the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s unreasonable delay standard is to
prevent the execution of a stale warrant.131 A warrant becomes stale if
the information supporting the warrant is not “sufficiently close in time
to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search conducted so
that probable cause can be said to exist as of the time of the search.”132
Important factors that a court should consider in determining whether
probable cause has dissipated include the type of the criminal activity
involved, the extent of the delay, and whether the seized property is
physical or digital in nature.133 The court in Brewer found that the digital nature of the evidence justified the several months’ delay in forensically examining the evidence and that such a delay did not alter the
probable cause analysis.134 Probable cause for believing that the media
contained child pornography existed at the time the warrant was executed, and therefore, the forensic examination at issue in Brewer did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.135
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
United States v. Syphers136 also held that a delay in execution of the
warrant under Rule 41 did not automatically render seized evidence inadmissible.137 The First Circuit noted that “[c]ourts have permitted
some delay in the execution of search warrants involving computers
because of the complexity of the search.”138 The court in Syphers held
that the five-month delay in examining the appellant’s computer did
not merit suppression of the seized evidence because the appellant
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
588 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1172-73.
Id. at 1173 (quoting United States v. Palega, 556 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Id.
Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173.
Id.
426 F.3d 461 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 469.
Id.
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failed to demonstrate that the delay altered the probable cause determination or that law enforcement acted in bad faith to evade constitutional requirements.139
The reasonableness standard also renders it unlikely that a federal court will impose specific time limitations that would restrain law
enforcement’s ability to acquire incriminating evidence. For example,
in United States v. Gorrell,140 the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the data recovered from the computers and camera was inadmissible due to the ten-month delay in processing.141 The court
found that the warrant at issue in Gorrell did not limit or specify the
time period in which the government was required to conduct its forensic analysis of the seized property and that other courts have declined
to impose “such a prophylactic constraint on law enforcement.”142
Thus, although the delay in Gorrell was extensive, it did not render the
forensic search beyond the scope of the warrant to the extent that the
evidence should have been suppressed.143
Finally, in United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc.,144 the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a
“[d]elay in executing a warrant beyond the time set forth in [Rule 41]
is not unreasonable unless, at the time it is executed, probable cause no
longer exists and the defendant demonstrates legal prejudice as a result
of the delay.”145 In Triumph, the warrant authorized a forensic search
that could have potentially taken weeks or months.146 The court explained that as long as the time period for the forensic search was “reasonable under the circumstances,” such a delay would not be unconstitutional.147 The court further noted that “neither Rule 41 nor the
Fourth Amendment impose any time limitation on the government’s
forensic examination of the evidence seized.”148 According to the
court, “computer searches are not, and cannot be subject to any rigid
time limit because they may involve much more information than an
ordinary document search, more preparation and a greater degree of
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
360 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2004).
Id. at 55 n.5.
Id.
Id.
211 F.R.D. 31 (D. Conn. 2002).
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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care in their execution.”149 Thus, the court in Triumph concluded that
the search in that case was not unreasonable.150
Many federal courts decline to impose rigid restraints and time
limitations on law enforcement efforts to procure digital evidence from
lawfully seized electronics. Indeed, most federal courts agree that as
long as a search is reasonable under the circumstances, evidence discovered in a subsequent forensic search of electronic data will generally be admissible. Accordingly, the reasonableness of a search will be
determined on a case-by-case basis and will usually depend on many
factors, including the nature of the crime, the delay between the initial
seizure and the subsequent search, the prejudice to the defendant, the
government’s good faith, and—of course—whether probable cause
still exists at the time of the forensic search.
VII.

THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH

DeProspero presented a novel issue for the New York State
Court of Appeals. As the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged,
neither the Fourth Amendment nor [the New York
State Constitution] specifically limit the length of time
property may be held following a lawful seizure. Nor is
such a limitation evident from the text of New York’s
statute governing the disposition of evidence obtained
by warrant. But the statutory omission is likely no
more than a concession to the impossibility of usefully
prescribing uniform limitations in this context.151
Thus, although the constitutionality of delayed forensic searches is an
emerging issue in New York, the court declined to impose uniform
time limitations on law enforcement. Consequently, the existence of
probable cause seems to be the keystone in upholding the constitutionality of a delayed forensic search.
For example, the continued existence of probable cause was the
linchpin of the Monroe County Court’s decision in People v. Loorie.152
In that case, the defendants, Debra Loorie and Stuart Sonnendecker,

149
150
151
152

Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 211 F.R.D. at 66.
Id.
DeProspero, 987 N.E.2d at 267.
630 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
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were co-owners of the Hilton Pharmacy.153 The two defendants were
indicted for stealing more than $50,000 from the Rochester Area Blue
Cross and Blue Shield by billing the two insurance companies for certain drug prescriptions that were not actually supplied to customers.154
A search warrant was executed, authorizing the police to examine any
pharmacy computers and hard drives for evidence relating to the
crime.155 The computer, the backup disks, and several dozen external
floppy disks were removed from the premises and were subsequently
examined by the police.156
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence discovered
during the forensic search of the computer.157 Their primary contention was that law enforcement “exceeded the scope of the warrant” by
subsequently examining the contents of the computer’s disk drive and
floppy disks.158 They argued that the warrant only authorized law enforcement to seize the computer and, therefore, that a second warrant
was required in order for the police to search for evidence contained
within the hard drives.159 The question before the court was whether
the police were required to obtain a second search warrant explicitly
authorizing the search of the contents of the seized computer and floppy disks.160
The Monroe County Court began its discussion by acknowledging that “this [was] a case of first impression.”161 Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ross,162 the court in
Loorie determined that the police did not need to obtain a second
search warrant in order to conduct a subsequent forensic examination
of the seized property.163 In Ross, the Supreme Court stated,
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to
the entire area in which the object of the search may be
found and is not limited by the possibility that separate
acts of entry or opening may be required to complete
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483.
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 10

1048

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

the search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to
search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in
which the weapon might be found. . . . This rule applies equally to all containers.164
Drawing upon this language, the court in Loorie held that any container165—including a hard drive—that is the subject of a properly issued
warrant may be thoroughly searched if it is reasonable to believe that it
could conceal the type of evidence specified in the warrant.166 Accordingly, the court held that the police did not exceed the scope of the
warrant by conducting a subsequent search of the hard drives because
it was reasonable for the police to believe that the disks contained the
type of evidence that was the subject of the search warrant.167 The
court concluded that a second search warrant was not necessary for the
police to review the items that were lawfully seized.168
Similarly, in People v. Burke,169 the defendant, who was
charged with numerous sex-related offenses involving children, moved
to suppress evidence obtained from his home pursuant to a search warrant.170 The warrant authorized the police to search Burke’s home for
evidence of child pornography, including journals, computer disks, and
photographic equipment.171 During the search, the police seized a
green metal box containing sexually explicit photographs of children
as well as two videotapes.172 The detectives subsequently examined
the contents of the videotapes and discovered that they contained evi-

164

Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-22.
A container is defined as any object used for or capable of holding, for transport or
storage, such as a carton, box, etc.
Container Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/container?s=t (last visited May 2, 2014).
166
Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 485. See also Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (“The scope of a warrantless search . . . is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found.”).
167
Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 486. See also United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (5th
Cir. 1973) (“[W]hen the police take custody of any sort of container . . . it is reasonable to
search the container to itemize the property to be held by the police. [This reflects] the underlying principle that the [F]ourth [A]mendment proscribes only unreasonable searches.”)
(first emphasis added).
168
Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
169
690 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
170
Id. at 905.
171
Id. at 901.
172
Id.
165
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dence of the defendant engaging in sexual acts with children.173 The
defendant was arrested and charged with numerous counts of sodomy,
promoting and possessing an obscene sexual performance of a child,
and endangering the welfare of a child.174
Burke sought suppression of the videotapes, contending that
the search of his home violated the Fourth Amendment.175 Specifically, the defendant argued that the police were not authorized to examine
the contents of the various videotapes.176 The Kings County Court rejected this argument and denied Burke’s motion to suppress the two
videotapes.177 The court first noted that the police are frequently permitted to seize items not specified in the warrant as long as “the warrant authorized the seizure of that type of property.”178 According to
the court, once the police observed that the videotapes were comingled
in a box containing sexually explicit photos, they could reasonably believe that the videotapes also contained evidence of child pornography.179 The court held that the videotapes were “containers” because
they are storage mediums for potentially explicit images, and as such,
the police are permitted to search their contents.180 Also relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ross, the court concluded that, under the
circumstances, the police were reasonable in examining the contents of
the videotapes to determine whether the tapes contained child pornography.181
Other New York cases involving the constitutionality of delayed searches revolved around the defendant’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. For example, in People v. Ramirez-Portoreal,182 the Court
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. at 901-02.
Burke, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 905-06.
Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
Burke, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Id. at 905-06.
Just as the search of the green box was authorized because there was reason to believe that it could contain the specified, illicit photographs,
there was reason to believe that the videotape cassettes found in the
green box may have served as ‘containers’—i.e., a storage medium—for
illicit moving images similar in type to the photographs specified in the
warrant.

Id.
181
182

Id. at 906.
666 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1996).
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of Appeals reiterated the basic requirement that in New York, a defendant seeking suppression of evidence must establish “that he or she
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item that was
searched.”183 A constitutionally protected privacy interest requires the
existence of a subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing
to recognize as reasonable.184 Thus, the reasonable expectation inquiry
has both objective and subjective components.
However, privacy concerns are not implicated “when the police
simply [look] again at what they had already lawfully seen.”185 The
forensic analysis of a blood sample and a forensic analysis of a computer are analogous. In both scenarios, a valid search warrant or subpoena authorizes the seizure of the blood sample or computer. Once
such property has been lawfully seized, privacy concerns are no longer
relevant because the suspect can no longer reasonably expect the contents of such property to remain private. The seizure of the property
necessarily implies that such property will ultimately be searched or
examined. The mere fact that the search occurs at a later date is insufficient to restore a legitimate expectation of privacy in the seized
item.186 For example, the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
King187 addressed the privacy concerns of a defendant’s blood sample
after it had been legally seized, but before it was fully examined.188
The court held:
It is [] clear that once a person’s blood sample has been
obtained lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy
claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments
with respect to the use of that sample. Privacy concerns
are no longer relevant once the sample has already lawfully been removed from the body, and the scientific
analysis of a sample does not involve any further search
and seizure of a defendant’s person. In this regard we
note that the defendant could not plausibly assert any
expectation of privacy with respect to the scientific
183

Id. at 213.
Id.
185
See People v. Natal, 553 N.E.2d 239, 241 (N.Y.1990) (“In that the greater intrusion
was justified, . . . the lesser related intrusion [can] not be said to unduly trespass upon any
remaining expectation of privacy.”).
186
See People v. Perel, 315 N.E.2d 452, 469 (N.Y. 1974).
187
663 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997).
188
Id. at 614.
184
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analysis of a lawfully seized item of tangible property,
such as a gun or a controlled substance. Although human blood, with its unique genetic properties, may initially be quantitatively different from such evidence,
once constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a
blood sample is not unlike other tangible property
which can be subject to a battery of scientific tests.189
Thus, pursuant to King, once an item of property is lawfully seized
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause, the police can take
a more detailed look of what they already seized because the defendant
no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy.190
In New York, the constitutionality of delayed forensic searches
is a contemporary issue that revolves around a rather traditional concept—the expectation of privacy. While establishing the existence of a
privacy interest is a prerequisite to a Fourth Amendment challenge,
most New York courts agree that such privacy interests no longer exist
after a suspect’s property has been seized pursuant to a valid warrant.
The foregoing cases stand for the proposition that it is permissible for
law enforcement to examine the contents of a suspect’s seized electronic media at a later date, so long as probable cause existed at the
time the property was seized.
VIII. CONCLUSION
People v. DeProspero addressed the growing concern of the effect that emerging technology has on the interpretation and scope of
the Fourth Amendment. With new technology underway, courts are
forced to analyze the constitutionality of searches and seizures in a
new light. While a search for physical evidence is a single-step process, i.e., a home is searched and the evidence is seized, a computer
search involves a two-step process by which the computer is seized
and then subsequently it is forensically searched for evidence.191 There
is no bright-line test for determining if a delay in forensic analysis results in an unreasonable search. Most federal courts seem to agree that
if probable cause still exists, the warrant will still be valid. Furthermore, the amendments that were made to the Federal Rules of Crimi189
190
191

Id. at 615.
Id. at 614.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee note.
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nal Procedure in 2009 address these concerns by declining to impose
rigid time restraints on law enforcement agents during the course of a
computer search. Although Rule 41 imposes no time restraints on law
enforcement officials, this could pose potential problems for the justice
system. Time restraints keep a warrant from becoming stale and judges should be encouraged to impose certain restraints, depending on the
totality of the circumstances of each case. If a warrant has become
stale and probable cause no longer exists at the time of the forensic examination, it may indeed be true that a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy has been restored and, as a result, any subsequent
search would be unreasonable.
It is widely acknowledged that the off-site forensic search of
computers takes much longer than an ordinary search, but this does not
justify an unreasonable delay in conducting a forensic analysis of
seized property. The police and other law enforcement agencies
should be required to adequately search the contents of seized items
before charging a suspect with a crime, and to do so within a reasonable period of time. While courts should not impose any rigid time constraints on law enforcement, they should address this issue on a caseby-case basis, analyzing all relevant factors and circumstances in order
to fairly balance an individual’s privacy interest with the state’s interest in protecting society from sexual predators.
Paige Bartholomew



J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Siena College, B.A.
(2012). I would like to thank Professor Gary Shaw and Professor Jeffrey Morris for their
guidance and assistance on this case note. I would also like to thank my Constitutional Law
Editor, Jared Artura, and the talented members of the Touro Law Review for their patience
and attention to detail during the editing process. I would like to thank my family and
friends, especially Joseph Fritzson, for their continued support and motivation throughout
my law school career.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/10

26

